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Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgeting Process 
in the Czech Republic*
ZDENKA MANSFELDOVÁ
Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic**
Abstract: The budget is the government’s key policy document. Negotiations on
the budget can be taken as a case study to analyse the bargaining process in leg-
islative institutions, reflecting the various clashes between political and partial
interests in parliament and in parliamentary committees. The distribution of po-
litical power in parliament is a crucial factor: if a minority cabinet is in power,
coalition-building is a key issue in budget bargaining. In this context, the Act on
the State Budget (which in many ways is the basic law relating to the function-
ing of the state and especially the state and public administration) is an example
of the efforts made to achieve a broad consensus and political compromises, not
only among coalition cabinet partners but also between the government coali-
tion and the opposition.
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Introduction
Accountability is a problem in every democracy and particularly in countries that
are in the process of building a democratic system and establishing a market econ-
omy. Accountability is connected to the delegation of power, the existence of the
usual democratic checks and balances, the potential abuse of power, and the exis-
tence of sanctions. The legislative foundation sets up the necessary framework for
accountability, but this may differ from actual political practices as ‘the rules of the
game’ are created gradually. Often the weaknesses of specific pieces of legislation
only become evident after the legislation has come into effect. Accountability is re-
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lated to the institutionalisation of democratic structures, the establishment of de-
mocratic values, the acquisition of experience, the professionalisation of the elites,
and, last but not least, external political and economic influences.
The concept of accountability, or the accountability of political power, is one
possible theoretical framework that can be used to interpret the relations between
the government and the parliament.1 The term accountability “expresses an old is-
sue of democracy, but an explicit effort to define the meaning of this term in the
context of political science appeared only in mid-1990s” [Krause 2000: 19]. The con-
cept of accountability is indeed somewhat speculative, but it provides a satisfacto-
ry interpretative framework for the host of relations and processes that take place
between citizens (voters) and politicians, between politicians themselves, and be-
tween political institutions and the elite in general [Brokl et al. 2001]. The term ‘ac-
countability’ is related in a number of ways to terms like ‘representation’, ‘respon-
siveness’, ‘reliability’, ‘answerability’, and ‘sanction’. However, it is not the aim here
to investigate these theoretical issues in depth.
This article draws on the generally accepted, basic differentiation between ver-
tical and horizontal accountability introduced by O’Donell [O’Donell 1998], accord-
ing to which vertical accountability “describes the relationships between unequal
[actors]”, including relationships between superiors and inferiors and between vot-
ers and their representatives. Electoral vertical accountability, which has frequently
been the subject of study (see, for example, Przeworski, Strøm, Stokes, Mulgan), is
the most powerful accountability mechanism. Horizontal accountability includes
relationships between equals, i.e. between democratic institutions themselves [e.g.
Schedler 1999]. Horizontal accountability depends on the existence of the classic
system of ‘checks and balances’ and includes the executive, legislative and judicia-
ry powers on one hand, and the institutions that supervise, control, interfere and
impose sanctions in the case of illegal misconduct on the other [O’Donnell 1998]. In
addition to vertical and horizontal accountability, a new dimension has appeared in
connection with globalisation. The introduction of reforms from outside by a num-
ber of international and supranational organisations, and their definition of stan-
dards, to which new democratic states must adhere in order to be accepted by these
supranational institutions, has an effect on accountability. 
The main objective of this article is to describe the accountability that exists
between parliament and the government, and the oversight function of parliament
with respect to the state budget. Negotiations over the budget can be viewed as one
example of the dynamic and multifaceted interaction that occurs between the exec-
utive and the legislature. The discussions over the state budget and financial mat-
ters form a distinct category of parliamentary activity that reflects the role of the
parliament in its historical framework. Parliament initially was granted the authori-
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1 Horizontal accountability [Merkel 2002]: control of the executive branch by parliament, 
control by the executive branch and/or public authorities by the judicial branch, the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch from the executive.
ty to oversee taxes, and it was only later that its legislative power derived from this
function. 
This article is the first study on the topic, and therefore, as well as being ana-
lytical, it is more descriptive than theoretical in character. The article is divided in-
to four sections. The first section describes the legal framework that regulates the
budget process; the second describes the discussion of the budget in parliament; the
third deals with the roles of parliament from the point of view of MPs in general and
with a special focus on the role of parliament with respect to the state budget; and
the fourth examines the budget committee and its activity in the budgetary process.
The legal framework that regulates the budget process
The relationship between the legislative branch (parliament) and the government is
defined in the Constitution. The relationship that exists in reality depends on how
the links between parliament and the government are institutionalised [see Kopec-
ký 2001]. The government is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, which has the
ability to introduce a motion of no confidence against the government. Parliament
also approves international treaties and makes major decisions concerning declara-
tions of war and dispatching armed forces outside the Czech Republic. The rela-
tionship between the powers of the legislative and the executive as defined in the
Constitution also indirectly defines the relationship between the two chambers of
the parliament. According to the Constitution the government is responsible only to
the Chamber of Deputies, which is the stronger of the two chambers. 
The formal framework for parliamentary bargaining is also defined in the Con-
stitution and in the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The Act on the
State Budget is approved solely by the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of
the Czech parliament.2 The actual bargaining procedure has evolved as MPs have
gained more experience with parliamentary work, as the relationship between the
government and parliament has gradually taken shape, and as composition of po-
litical forces has changed.
The budget is a complex document with state financial data that enables the
comparison of total expenditures and total income and the ranking of expenditures
according to importance and makes it possible to influence the economic situation
and improve parliamentary control [Syllová 1993:2]. The authorisation of taxes and
public expenditures is a primary function of the legislature in any democratic sys-
tem. In the budget process the government plays a primary role, which manifests it-
self especially in the preparatory phase. It is understandable that the government is
the only institution that drafts the budget given the fact that the budget in reality is
essentially the government’s programme and action plan, which affects life and de-
velopment in the country. Moreover, only the government has the relevant infor-
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2 For a more detailed analysis of the budget as a legal category, see Karfíková [2004].
mation required to draft the budget. The Ministry of Finance plays the most impor-
tant role in drafting the budget and is also of key significance given that it defines
income as well as expenditures. The budget is rendered legally binding by the par-
liament in a special law, from which no rights or obligations arise for citizens.
The budget negotiation process can be taken as a case study to analyse the
bargaining process in legislative institutions, and it can also be viewed as an exam-
ple of how the government is accountable to parliament. As Pelizzo, Stapenhurst
and Olson have shown, differences can be found according to the type of govern-
ment: “legislatures in parliamentary systems have more oversight tools at their dis-
posal than legislatures in either presidential or semi-presidential systems. The per-
centage of parliaments that approves and confirms the budget is according their
findings remarkably higher in parliamentary systems” [Pelizzo et al 2004: 7–8]. The
role of parliaments in the budget process is currently undergoing a re-evaluation in
terms of putting greater stress on this role [cf. Santiso and Belgrano 2004]. With the
growing number of democracies around the world there is a growing demand for
transparency and accountability in the policy-making process, including the deci-
sion-making process within the parliament and the government. Understanding
and describing this process is important for identifying its weak points, which could
lead to a disruption of the balance between the executive power and legislative over-
sight and also has the potential to give rise to corruption. As Forestiere and Pelizzo
have pointed out, in the parliamentary system legislatures have considerable power
to influence and shape the budget. In reality, however, this power is remarkably less
than what the list of formal powers suggests. Each parliament’s ability to examine,
amend, modify, confirm, and approve the budget is constrained by both institu-
tional and political factors. On the institutional side, in many countries parliament’s
ability to alter the government’s budget is subject to extensive procedural restric-
tions [Forestiere and Pelizzo 2005]. In the Czech case, parliament can modify the
budget, but it must not violate any of the various laws that circumscribe its ability
to do so. In reality parliament approves the government’s budget proposal with on-
ly minor changes [Schick 2002: 36–38].
All the components in the budget are closely connected. As a whole the bud-
get represents the government policy submitted to parliament. When the budget is
being evaluated, the role of parliament is not to assess each detail, but rather to sur-
vey its characteristics as a policy instrument. The rights of MPs to intervene in the
content of the budget are limited, so that no infringement occurs of the budget’s ba-
sic premise (the amount of expenditures). When considering the rights of MPs and
parliament to amend the budget it is necessary to bear in mind that the budget is a
complex document that must be prepared well in advance but simultaneously with
an understanding and respect for the current economic situation. This implies that
parliament must voluntarily limit its power to change the budget. Nevertheless it re-
tains the ability to examine the implementation of the budget through the govern-
ment’s accountability to parliament. 
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Debating the budget in the Chamber of Deputies
The procedure of approving the state budget differs from the general legislative
process. The negotiations over the state budget are governed by rules laid out in the
Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The budget negotiation process3
proceeds as follows: The cabinet submits a draft act on the state budget to the
speaker of the Chamber of Deputies no later than three months prior to the start of
a new fiscal year (by 30 September of the preceding year); the government’s fiscal
year corresponds to the calendar year, as is the case in the majority of countries.4
Amendments to the draft act may be submitted up to 15 days before the session of
the Chamber of Deputies in which the first reading is to take place. The speaker as-
signs the draft act on the state budget to the Budget Committee for discussion.
There is no specialised budget research organisation attached to the legislature that
conducts analyses of the budget. After the draft act is assigned to the Budget Com-
mittee, the first reading takes places at a session of the Chamber of Deputies. Dur-
ing the first reading, the Chamber of Deputies has a general parliamentary debate
on the basic aspects of the budget, such as revenues and expenditures, the balance,
settlement of the balance, the general relationship to the budgets of the higher ter-
ritorial administrative units and municipalities, and the scope of powers assigned to
executive bodies. If the draft act is not approved, the Chamber recommends that the
cabinet redraft the bill, and sets a date for the new draft to be submitted. If the
Chamber of Deputies approves the basic aspects of the budget it is not possible to
change them later in the negotiations. The draft of the state budget is debated in-
dependently and it cannot be contingent upon a proposal for the adoption or
amendment of another act [Kolář, Pecháček and Syllová 2002: 188].
If the Chamber of Deputies approves the basic information in the draft act on
the state budget, individual chapters are then assigned to committees.5 Committees
are assigned a deadline (the minimum period is 30 days) and are obligated to dis-
cuss the individual chapters of the draft act on the state budget they have been giv-
en by that deadline. Committees may propose changes only to those chapters of the
state budget they have been assigned to discuss. 
The Budget Committee debates the committees’ resolutions and opposing
views on individual chapters of the draft bill in the presence of rapporteurs and it
adopts a resolution. During the second reading, the government introduces the
draft act on the state budget. The Budget Committee’s rapporteur speaks after the
submitting party. During the detailed parliamentary debate, amendments and oth-
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3 Rules of Procedure, Part Thirteen.
4 According to the first OECD budgetary survey, in 77.7% of OECD countries the fiscal year
is the calendar year. See See http://ocde.dyndns.org/Contentall.aspx
5 The Ministry of Finance provides the design of the budget chapters; individual committees
debate the internal contents of relevant chapters, and this is where deputies play a crucial
role. Hypothetically, the potential impact of various interest groups may be expected at this
point. 
er proposals are submitted. From a political perspective, the review phase is the
most important, because it is in this phase that individual MPs (who, for example,
did not have a chance to directly participate in the preparation of the draft act) try
to secure funds for their constituencies.
The third reading of the draft act on the state budget cannot start until
48 hours have elapsed since the conclusion of the second reading. During the par-
liamentary debate the only items that may be proposed are corrections of legislative
mistakes, corrections of technical errors, corrections of grammatical mistakes, and
proposals to repeat the second reading. At the conclusion of the third reading the
Chamber of Deputies votes on the submitted amendments, and at the end the
Chamber decides whether it will express agreement with the draft act.
In the first half of the 1990s, at the beginning of the transformation process, the
procedure was somewhat different. Until the adoption of the new Rules of Procedure
in mid-1995, the draft act (the whole budget) was discussed by the Budget Commit-
tee and also by a number of other committees, after which a joint report was sub-
mitted. This procedure offered more opportunity for lobbying, and it was easier for
a lay opinion to defeat a professional opinion as each committee had only one vote
and the special Budget and Economy Committees comprised a minority (of the usu-
al 4–5 committees involved). An amendment to the Rules of Procedure resulted in
the Budget Committee obtaining more competencies. Currently, it is very difficult for
an MP to secure any funds for his/her own constituency because an MP is expected
to specify how the proposed expenditure will be paid for, i.e. what other expendi-
tures should be cut in order to obtain money for the specific purpose.
The most important stage of the bargaining process is the first reading, which
is meant to give a clear outline of the total amount of the mandatory expenditures
(i.e. expenditures explicitly required by law), the total expenditures and revenues,
the balance of the state budget, and the budgets of municipalities. The Budget Com-
mittee must seek to preserve a balance between revenues and expenditures. After
deducting the mandatory expenditures, about 15% of the total funds allocated for
expenditures remain. It is then necessary to come to an agreement on which sphere
(e.g. education, science, or healthcare) will be emphasised. This percentage is fur-
ther reduced when account is taken of the ongoing investment projects of the gov-
ernment that cannot be abandoned and their unwritten international obligations
(percentages that are given for certain chapters of the budget, such as for science or
for defence). This means that all the media exposure given to budgetary issues ac-
tually concerns a small number of the items debated in the parliament. Any pro-
posals for changes from the MPs cause the dilemma of public budgeting: while the
costs are born by the general fund, benefits go to specific groups, sectors, or locali-
ties. It should be mentioned here that the first round of assembling particular ex-
penditures takes place in the ministries. This is why the ministries seem to be in a
much better position to advance particular interests, as this environment is much
less transparent compared to the parliament, and the Chamber of Deputies is only
the second step in lobbying.
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The growing percentage of mandatory and quasi-mandatory expenditures and
expenditure programmes that have already been launched limit the flexibility of the
public budget expenditures in the short term.6 The disproportionate increase in
mandatory expenditures, which significantly exceeds the growth of tax income rev-
enues, is a fundamental problem of cabinet fiscal policy today, and it has drawn
harsh criticism from the opposition.
As already mentioned, the Act on the State Budget is approved by the Cham-
ber of Deputies. The negotiation is ideologically divided from the very beginning of
the process, and therefore the debate and the voting on the state budget are always
key issues for parliamentary party groups. The vote on the budget is public, and of-
ficial records on the vote are available. This means that, should the budget not be
passed, political parties know who was responsible for the government’s defeat. The
Constitution stipulates that MPs shall exercise their office in their best conscience
and in conformity with their oath, and that they shall not be bound by any instruc-
tions. Nevertheless, parties do have different mechanisms for securing party disci-
pline. A parliamentary faction may vote in unity because its members agree on a
party position (party cohesion), or it may be that they were made to act in such a way,
even though their own preferences differed (party discipline) [Linek and Rakušanová
2002]. The vote on the budget requires considerable party discipline, and voting at
variance with the decision adopted by a parliamentary party group may have very
unpleasant consequences for individual MPs, especially if the cabinet has a very
narrow margin in the Chamber of Deputies [Mansfeldová 2002]. Since 1996 this has
been a major problem, as successive governments have continuously had to grapple
with a narrow majority. The exception was the minority social democratic govern-
ment, which managed to prevail as a result of the Opposition Agreement.7 The rea-
son for the relatively low degree of party unity is the size of the voting coalitions
that approve individual bills: when there is a large majority the parliamentary par-
ty groups do not have to act with absolute unity [see Linek and Rakušanová 2002].
This results in lowering the transaction costs political parties would otherwise have
to expend to ensure that their bills are approved by narrow-margin majorities. As
an example, at the beginning of 1997, when the cabinet had a narrow majority, two
MPs  from ČSSD who did not vote according to the approved party line on the state
budget were expelled from the party after the vote [Mansfeldová 2005]. One of them
soon afterwards joined the rightwing party ODS.
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7 The Agreement on Creating a Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic, con-
cluded between the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Civic Democratic Party
(ODS).
The activities of parliament
There are four main stages in the budget process: formulation, approval, execution,
and oversight and control. The role of parliament is crucial in the approval phase
and the oversight and control phase. The approval of the budget is generally one of
the key tasks of parliament, and, as can be gleaned from Table 1, which presents
MPs responses to the question of the importance of individual activities of the Par-
liament, MPs consider it one of the most important activities. Alongside the explic-
itly formulated control of the cabinet, MPs still accorded the most importance to the
adoption of the state budget, which is one of the means by which the cabinet can be
indirectly controlled [Reytt 2000; Soltéz 1995]. In the survey MPs were asked to eval-
uate the importance of individual activities of parliament. The higher the score the
greater importance accorded that particular activity.
When the scores for each activity are compared over time and in individual
functional terms, it is found that MPs consistently rate the approval of the state bud-
get as among the most important activities. While the scores for other activities tend
to change over time, the trend for the approval of the state budget remains stable.
This also concurs with the perception of the prestige and importance of the com-
mittees that is described below. 
Voting on the budget is not only a special kind of vote of confidence in the gov-
ernment, but is also a litmus test of the unity of the factions and/or government
coalition. An analysis of how MPs in the Chamber of Deputies have voted on state
budgets also shows that the state budget vote is one of the key political issues that
are usually decided strictly along party lines. Data on the vote on state budgets is
only available back to 1995, as there are no records of the votes before that year. The
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Activities                                              1993         1996          1998          2000         2003
Legislative activities 4.78 4.50 4.67 4.97 4.72
Control over the government 4.61 4.22 3.94 4.64 4.27
Consideration and evaluation 
of proposals submitted by various 
social groups 3.22 2.83 3.00 3.74 3.17
Approval of the state budget 4.78 4.72 4.72 4.95 4.80
Processing petitions and 
comments of citizens 3.39 1.56 3.22 3.86 3.37 
Preparation for EU accession –.* –.* 4.22 4.61 4.06 
1 = least important, 5 = most important.
Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic.
* the data present the dates of the empirical research, and within this period there were
four parliaments including the current one, whose terms concludes in 2006. 
Table 1 The importance of individual activities of parliament between 1993 and 2003*
data on these ten votes are presented in Tables 2 to 5, which show the percentage
of each PPG that voted in favour of a submitted budget, abstained or did not par-
ticipate (often allowing the budget to be adopted). The data indicate considerable
party discipline in voting on the state budget.
During the second term of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, the ruling
coalition was made up of the following parties: ODS, KDU-ČSL and ODA. When
the cabinet resigned at the end of 1997, the 1998 budget had already been approved. 
The third term of the Parliament of the Czech Republic featured a minority so-
cial democratic cabinet (ČSSD), which was able to stay in power thanks to the Op-
position Agreement reached with the strongest opposition party, ODS. This agree-
ment between the government and the opposition limited the executive’s scope of
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Table 2. Voting on the state budgets in the first electoral term (% of party members)
ČMSS  ČSSD   KDS  KDU-ČSL  KSČM     LB    LSNS       LSU    ODA    ODS    SPR-RSČ
(ČMUS)
1995 0 11 100 100 0 0 100 0 94 100 0
1996 31 0 100 100 0 0 100 – 100 98 0 
Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.
Note: During the term the ruling coalition consisted of the following parties: ODS, KDS,
KDU-ČSL, and ODA.
Table 3. Voting on the state budgets in the second electoral term (%)
ČSSD    KDU-ČSL     KSČM      ODA         ODS       SPR-RSČ 
1997 3 100 0 100 99 0
1998 0 100 0 100 100 0
Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.
Table 4. Voting on the state budgets in the third electoral term (%)
ČSSD            KDU-ČSL        KSČM              ODS                  US 
1999 97 90 100 0 0
2000 100 0 0 88 0
2001 93 5 0 90 0
2002 96 0 0 98 0 
Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.
action with respect to the budget and the staffing of economic and other strategic
committees [UNRISD 2004: 3].
In the fourth (and current) term, a coalition cabinet (consisting of ČSSD, 
KDU-ČSL and US) with a narrow, one-vote parliamentary majority is in power. Such
a narrow majority requires strong party discipline because the budget and the fate
of the government hang on a single vote.
It may happen that the budget is not passed at the first attempt, as was the
case with the 2000 budget, which was only backed by the MPs in the minority gov-
ernment of the Social Democratic Party. Right-wing MPs voted against the budget,
and the Communists abstained from voting. As a result, the government operated
on a provisional budget. The budget had to be renegotiated again at the beginning
of 2000, at which time the opposition parties reached an agreement and the budget
was approved (this can be seen in Table 3).
The Budget Committee
In every parliament, legislative and supervisory activities are carried out in the par-
liamentary committees [Rakušanová 2001; Kopecký 2001; Olson and Crowther
2002; Mansfeldová et al. 2002], where major decisions are made on the majority of
bills. With the exception of legislation, the most important task of the committees
is to review the functioning of the cabinet. This task is the natural result of a system
of government in which the administration is directly and continuously responsible
to the parliament. Committees are the main practical working instruments through
which these responsibilities are carried out. 
The Budget Committee plays a crucial role in the negotiation of the budget. The
budget is discussed as a bill, and before being presented at the plenary session the
bill is sent first to the Budget Committee. In most countries, the Budget Committee
has the highest authority in this matter and it submits the major report. The case is
similar in the Czech Republic. While analysing the prestige of individual parliamen-
tary committees, it was found that the Budget Committee is one of the most presti-
gious and busiest committees of the Chamber of Deputies, as indicated in Table 6. 
A similar trend can be seen in how the committees are rated by prestige as is
found in the ratings for the individual activities of parliament. With the exception
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3
452
ČSSD           KDU-ČSL          KSČM             ODS            US-DEU 
2003 100 100 0 0 90
2004 100 0 0 100 100
Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.
Table 5. Voting on the state budgets in the fourth electoral term (%)
of the first term, the Budget Committee is consistently perceived as having the most
prestige. This is mirrored in the Budget Committee’s composition, as there is a ten-
dency to appoint MPs with high professional skills to the committee. The members
of the Budget Committee also tend to have a high probability of re-election. In the
case of re-election, they usually again join the Budget Committee. As for gender rep-
resentation, it is worth noting that this committee is purely a ‘men’s issue’. During
the period under observation not a single woman sat on the Committee. 
The responsibilities of the Budget Committee extend far beyond just debating
the state budget and the individual chapters of the budget. The Committee receives
regular reports on the economic performance of the Czech Republic (quarterly, mid-
year and a summary report for the whole year), the withdrawal of funds from the
state budget, reports on monetary policy and the economic performance of the
Czech National Bank (ČNB), reports on the results of activities and the utilisation of
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Table 6. Committees in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic ranked by MPs
according to prestige (%)
Committee                                               1st term             2nd term     3rd term     4th term
1993         1996          1998          2000          2003
Constitutional Committee 91.9 88.7 63.9 60.9 40.2
Budget Committee 61.0 89.4 84.1 89.4 91.1
Economic Committee 60.3 41.5 42.7 49.7 49.7
Foreign Affairs Committee 26.5 21.3 27.4 20.7 25.4
Committee for Defense 
and Security 11.8 16.3 28.0 25.1 17.2
Committee for Social Policy 
and Health Care 8.1 12.0 22.3 15.1 10.1
Committee for Science. 
Education. Culture, Youth, 
and Sports 5.1 7.0 4.5 2.8 5.9
Petition Committee 3.7 2.8 0.6 1.7 3.6
Agricultural Committee 2.9 7.7 9.6 5.0 11.8
Committee for Public 
Administration, Regional 
Development, and Environment 2.2 1.4 7.6 18.4 16.6
Committee for European 
Integration * * * 5.0 4.1
Mandate and Immunity 
Committee 1.5 4.2 2.5 3.4 2.4
Election Committee * * * * 1.2
Source: Parliamentary DICe, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic.
* in these years the committee did not exist.
budget funds in individual years, and reports on the country’s economic perfor-
mance issued by the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. 
The Budget Committee can establish sub-committees to perform its supervi-
sory responsibilities, and these sub-committees focus on specific issues. The Budget
Committee decides on the number and types of sub-committees it establishes. Dur-
ing almost every term of the Parliament of the Czech Republic there has been an au-
dit sub-committee.
The Budget Committee debates any and all changes during the course of the
year that occur with respect to events funded by the state budget and transfers of
funds in the budget chapters for individual ministries etc. As the deficit of the state
budget8 is currently growing, MPs are striving to play a more active role even in the
budget preparation phase. An example of this was the proposed balanced budget
amendment to the constitutional act submitted by a group of MPs in September
1998. Though the bill was defeated in the first reading in January 1999, it did not
end there. Changes in external prerequisites have put the question of a well-bal-
anced budget back on the agenda. As Klik shows in his study on EU-15 states, as
the EMU project was gradually being prepared over the course of the 1990s it be-
came clear that it would be necessary to introduce a mechanism to prevent the un-
controlled fiscal expansion of national governments. It is difficult to harmonise a
common monetary policy with autonomously implemented budget policies. It
should also be pointed out that it is this combination of a jointly implemented mon-
etary policy and only a co-ordinated fiscal policy that many economists see as the
greatest threat to the EMU project [Klik 2002: 2].
If we examine the activities of the Budget Committee since 1990, it is possible
to conclude that legislative activity relating to the state budget, especially in the leg-
islative phase, is increasing (see Table 7).
The Budget Committee, as well as other committees, has been adopting a grow-
ing number of resolutions on the state budget that relate not only to drafting the bud-
get but also to control over the budget. This situation has not changed much with re-
gard to how much of an opportunity individual MPs have to influence the prepara-
tion of the budget: the MPs of the ruling parties have more opportunities to formal-
ly and informally influence the budget. Conversely, opposition MPs take greater ad-
vantage of parliamentary hearings. Furthermore, lobbyists tend to influence the
process through the MPs of the ruling parties because it is a more efficient approach.
The cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for meeting the state
budget obligations. After the elapse of three months, the cabinet submits a quar-
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8 On 3 December 2003 the Chamber of Deputies passed a draft of the 2004 state budget with
98 votes from the coalition deputies. The budget is expected to have a deficit of CZK 115 bil-
lion, with revenues of CZK 754 billion and expenditures of CZK 869 billion. The state bud-
get deficit continues to grow. In 2003, the government approved a three-year consolidation
programme aimed at reducing the growing public budget deficit to no more than 4% of GDP
by 2006.
terly report, and after six months the cabinet submits a mid-year report to the
Chamber of Deputies. The mid-year report provides information on economic de-
velopment and a comprehensive update on the implementation of the budget, in-
cluding an updated forecast on the budget outcome for that fiscal year. The Budget
Committee plays a key role in this quarterly and semi-annual review process. The
year-end report, the Government Financial Statement, is the government’s key ac-
countability document. The Budget Committee debates its individual chapters, and
the Chamber of Deputies approves the Government Financial Statement. 
Effective legislative oversight of the budget is generally connected to the level
at which the rules in the new democratic parliaments have been institutionalised.
As indicated above, the Budget Committee may establish various sub-committees to
perform its supervisory functions. In the third term these were the Sub-committee
for Capital and Financial Markets and the Audit Sub-committee; in the fourth term
(2002 – present) the Sub-committee for the Financial Management of Regional Self-
administration and for the Utilisation of European Funds was established in addi-
tion to the Audit Sub-committee.
During the process of decentralisation, which is part of the process of European
integration (based on which a wide range of decision-making powers were trans-
ferred, in 2001, from the central to the district level), parliament strengthened its su-
pervisory function. If the Audit Sub-committee is understood to be the control mech-
anism of parliament vis-à-vis the cabinet, then the Sub-committee for the Financial
Management of Regional Self-Administration and for the Utilisation of Funds of the
European Union is an attempt to partially control the financial flows between supra-
national (EU funds) and sub-national levels (districts) [Rakušanová 2003]. 
During the process of consolidating democracy in the Czech Republic, parlia-
ment has become functionally embedded in the constitutional system, while MPs
have become more professional, there has been an improvement in the level of pro-
fessional back-up, and the functions of parliament have become crystallised. Today,
public finances are undergoing extensive structural reform, which involves more
than just minor modifications and should result in the restructuring of the state
budget and especially in changes to welfare, pension, tax and healthcare spending.
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Tab. 7. Work of the Budget Committee in five terms 1990–2004
Term                                     1990–    1992–    1996–    1998–    2002 till   From       2003      2004       
1992      1996     1998      2002   elections 7.7.2002
Number of members            17–18   17–20 20 21 21 21 21 21
Number of committee 
meetings 65 78 36 59 24 8 14 16
Number of adopted 
resolutions 398 627 318 560 324 116 196 176
Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic
The main objective of the reform is to transform the state budget from a tool of fis-
cal policy into a public management tool, i.e. a performance-driven model based on
defined goals and benchmarks, on negotiations, and on a system of contracts and
agreements.
Conclusion
An analysis of parliamentary activities in relation to the state budget shows that
during the process of transformation and the consolidation of democracy in the
Czech Republic the functions of parliament in relation to the state budget have un-
dergone a massive transformation. In this process, the professionalising of MPs in
general and those in the Budget Committee in particular has been a crucial factor.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Budget Committee, like parliament as a whole,
was composed of people without any previous experience in high politics. Only
rarely did an MP have a background in economics. At the first meeting of the bud-
get committee it was proposed that appointments take into account an MP’s pro-
fessional background. This proposal was rejected, and it was agreed to distribute
posts in the committee among all political parties equally. Gradually, MPs have be-
come more professional and have learned how to work with information, how to ob-
tain it, and how to evaluate it critically. Today, the Budget Committee is considered
the most prestigious and most influential parliamentary body. 
The problem with the role of parliament in the budgeting process lies primar-
ily in the need for large coalitions in voting, and in the large transaction costs asso-
ciated with party cohesion, i.e. in the party-political landscape rather than in any in-
stitutional capacity. Generally, there has been an increase in party discipline in vot-
ing on the budget. On the other hand, the number of changes that are proposed by
individual MPs has also grown. 
Parliament is aware that its power may be eroded within the context of Euro-
pean integration, and therefore, to counter that threat, it is strengthening its audit-
ing functions. This pertains also to the Budget Committee, which focuses on the
sub-national and supranational levels, the management of territorial self-adminis-
trations and the utilisation of European Union funds. It may be expected that with
the Czech Republic now a member of the EU (since May 2004) this type of activity
will be given priority. 
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Apendix 1.
Names of Political Parties in English and Czech and their Czech Abbreviations
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Abbreviation 
ČMSS/
ČMUS
ČSSD
KDU – ČSL
KDS
KSČM
LB
LSNS
LSU
ODA
ODS
SPR – RSČ
US
US – DEU
Party name in English
Czech-Moravian Centre Party /
Bohemian and Moravian Union 
of the Centre
Czech Social Democratic Party
Christian Democratic Union –
Czechoslovak People's Party
Christian Democratic Party
Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia
Left Block
National Socialist Liberal Party
Liberal-Social Union
Civic Democratic Alliance
Civic Democratic Party
Association for the Republic – 
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia
Freedom Union
Freedom Union – Democratic Union
Party name in Czech
Českomoravská strana středu/
Českomoravská unie středu
Česká strana sociálně demokra-
tická
Křesťansko demokratická unie/
Československá strana lidová
Křesťansko demokratická strana
Komunistická strana Čech 
a Moravy
Levý blok
Liberální strana národně sociální
Liberal-Social Union
Občanská demokratická aliance
Občanská demokratická strana
Sdružení pro republiku – Repub-
likánská strana Československa
Unie svobody
Unie svobody – Demokratická
unie
